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What rules and procedures govern or should govern the administrative
trial treatment of business secrets? While this inquiry leads immediately
into the protection of business information in several contexts-for
example, the discovery of business secrets, the disclosure of business
secrets in trial testimony-many questions must remain untouched.
Critical business information comes into contact with the administrative
process at many other levels-rulemaking hearings, informational
investigations, public inquiries for agency files, to name a few. I will 'not
discuss the treatment of business secrets in these contexts.
Business Secrets
What is it, then, that we mean when we refer to "business secrets"
(or to use the legal term, "trade secrets")? We must know what they
are before we can decide whether and how much protection they deserve.
The lawyer commonly searches for accurate, acceptable definitions.
Unfortunately he seldom finds them. Trade secrets are no exceptions.
Courts have struggled for decades. One court accurately described
matters when it observed:
In the law of trade secrets, embracing mechanical engines,
chemical formulae, confidential lists and the like, matters ranging
from sugar in tea for sweetening purposes to the most complicated
machines will be encountered. Questions as to classification will
arise and their solution may not always be free from difficulties.
Examples may be more helpful than definition or attempted
redefinition. . . .
Giving up, then, before having started, a review of the cases reveals that
protection is granted under the "trade secret" label to almost anything
used in a business which gives one business an advantage over his
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competitors who neither know nor use it.' A business secret may be a
formula for a chemical compound (which need not be patentable), a
pattern or design for making a machine, a manufacturing process, or
even a list of current customers. If you will recall the last time you
watched three and four year-olds at play and think of each child as
competing businesses, you will understand what I mean. Whatever the
one has the other wants; and, as a result, what each has becomes
valuable. So it is with many business properties.
But this really is still not very helpful. Perhaps I can clarify the picture
by spelling out some features present in trade secret cases. There are, I
believe, some common threads. First, the information must be secret.
Matters of public or trade knowledge cannot be business secrets. This
includes anything that could be made public even if now secret. For
example, a chemical formula used to produce a better toothpaste is not
a business secret if it can be determined by chemical analysis of the
finished product sold by the grocer or druggist. Second, the process or
data must be used in the on-going operation of the business. Single or
emphemeral events in the conduct of a business-such as the amount or
terms of a secret contract bid, the salary of certain employees, or the
date fixed for announcing a new policy or model-are usually not
protected. In other words, a business secret must actually be of some
continuing value to the business seeking to protect it; the mere labeling
of information as sensitive is not enough. Finally, the subject matter of
a trade secret usually relates to the production of goods. But it need not
be so limited. In administrative hearings, in fact, it usually relates to
information about the sale of goods or other operations of a firm.
Conceptually, this division can be labeled as ideas or know-how.' The
former include such things as manufacturing processes; that is,
something having value independent from any connection with a
particular firm. Know-how, on the other hand, is of peculiar value to the
owner; it includes internal business facts such as customer lists which
have no value outside the particular business connection but which could
be ruinous if disclosed to competitiors. It is this latter group which
creates the most troublesome problems in administrative hearings. At
one time the Federal Trade Commission sought to distinguish between
what it called traditional trade secrets (by which it meant ideas) and
2For a compilation of the cases, see Doerfer, The Limits of Trade Secret Law Imposed
by Federal Patent and Antitrust Supremacy, 80 HARV. L. REV. 1432, 1437 (1967); R.
MILGRIM, TRADE SECRETS § 2.01 (1969). See generally, 4 RESTATEMENT OF TORTS § 757
(0939) (comments).
3See R. CALLMAN, 2 UNFAIR COMPETITION, TRADE MARKS AND MONOPOLIES § 52 (3d
ed. 1968).
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confidential business information (such as sales figures); it said that
ideas generally were entitled to protection and that except in unusual
circumstances, sales were not. But this distinction proved unsound and
appears to have been abandoned. The protection of each now depends
on proof under the same standard.!
The Use of Judicial A nalogues
Before considering what business secrets deserve protection in
administrative hearings, however, one caveat needs to be noted. When
looking for analogues for deciding current questions, the temptation is
to accept helpful judicial classifications of trade secrets regardless of the
type of action involved. Unnecessary confusion may result. The
substantive law of trade secrets, whether an action to punish a thief or
to protect sensitive data from an unwanted invasion, fills many volumes.
On the other hand, opinions and articles spelling out procedural
protection for trade secrets-for example, does trial testimony deserve
confidential treatment-are harder to find. The natural tendency, then,
is to rely on substantive definitions when deciding procedural questions.
This can be both wrong and misleading. Different interests are at stake.
The court is dealing with separate questions, and its answers must be
examined in context.
In deciding whether a substantive action is available, the court starts
from the premise that valuable business secrets are an important interes
deserving protection. Thus, it protects the owner of the trade secret
against "breaches of faith and reprehensible means of learning another's
secrets."' The question is not whether the information should become
public knowledge, but should the person who made it public, disclosed
it to another, or stole it for his own use, be held accountable. The answer
may depend upon whether the defendant obtained the trade secret
wrongfully or whether the sensitive data is so intertwined with an
employee's skill that providing protection would constitute an
unwarranted interference with his opportunity to be employed
'Compare H. P. Hood & Sons, Inc., 58 F.T.C. 1184 (1961), with Crown Cork & Seal
Co., Dkt, No. 8687 (FTC June 26, 1967); see E. Gellhorn, The Treatment of Confidential
Information by the Federal Trade Commission: The Hearing, 116 U. PENN. L. REV. 401,
415-21 & n.109 (1968).
'Whether this interest is based on a property right or a confidential relation is disputed.
Compare E. I. Du Pont de Nemours Powder Co. v. Masland, 244 U.S. 100 (1917)
(Holmes, J.), with National Starch Prods., Inc. v. Polymer Indus., Inc., 273 App. Div.
732, 79 N.Y.S. 2d 357 (Ist Dep't 1948). See Stedman, Trade Secrets, 23 OHIo ST. L.J.
4, 21 (1962); Developments in the Law-Competitive Torts, 77 HARV. L. REV. 888, 948-
49 (1964); R. ELLIS, TRADE SECRETS § 6 (1953); R. MILGRIM, supra note 2, § 1.01.
14 RESTATEMENT OF TORTS § 757, comment b (19239).
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elsewhere. That is to say, protection of the trade secret as a question of
substantive law depends on proof that the defendant either wrongfully
acquired the information or has (or will) improperly disclose it.
The question of confidential testimony-that is, procedural protection
of business information-starts from a different base. Roughly speaking
the propriety of the acquisition or disclosure of the information is not
at stake. Instead, the question is whether the documents or testimony
should be disclosed in open court. The issue, in other words, is whether
the need for confidentiality outweighs the undesirability or inconvenience
resulting from protective treatment. The secrecy of the data or ideas is
again a threshold question. But in the procedural context, close questions
are usually decided in favor of confidentiality. While the owner (that is,
witness) can occasionally succeed by attacking the questioner's need for
the sensitive information, the dispute is usually limited to the manner in
which the information is received-in public hearing on an open record
or in camera for use only by the parties and the court. Since the
information is being made available for use in the hearing, the argument
for unlimited disclosure is less compelling.
A din inistrative Proceedings
Your concern with business secrets, of course, is generally limited to
procedural questions.' Should sensitive data be protected from open
disclosure in administrative hearings? Since the answer obviously is yes,
at least in some hearings, the tough problems are when and how.
The judicial treatment of business secrets in civil trials preceded the
administrative practice and consequently provides the backdrop for
current procedures.' Courts have long ruled that the possessor of secret
information has only a qualfied duty to testify. There is no absolute
privilege such as that afforded marital, physician-patient, or attorney-
client communications, however. In contrast to such privileges, the trade
secrets exception seeks only to safeguard the sensitive information, not
(as with the other privileges) the confidential relationship.
The scope of the trade secrets "privilege," if it can be called that,
then, depends on the type of information sought and the interests
affected if disclosed or withheld. In the information is indispensable for
ascertaining the facts, it is clearly established that the privilege must give
7At one time the Federal Trade Commission used its powers under § 5 of the FTC Act
(prohibiting "unfair methods of competition in commerce") to prosecute substantive trade
secret actions. See Philip Carey Mfg. Co. v. FTC, 29 F.2d 49 (6th Cir. 1928); Standard
Car Equipment Co., I F.T.C. 144 (1918). Except for this early period, the Commission
has relied upon prosecution by private parties to police this area.
1 have summarized the judicial analogue in Gellhorn, supra note 4, at 409.
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way even though the possessor of the secret is a bystander who may be
unfairly injured by broad dissemination of the information. While civil
trials generally are private matters, the public interest in having all
citizens freely give their testimony outweighs private fears. Nevertheless,
"courts are loath to order disclosure of trade secrets absent a clear
showing of an immediate need for the information requested." '
Moreover, once disclosure is deemed necessary, the court will usually
impose conditions designed to limit the demanding party's use of the
information only in the litigation and to prevent disclosure to
competitors or the public at large.
As one would expect, administrative adjudicatory hearings adhere to
these basic principles. Administrative trials are, like their judicial
counterparts, invariably public. 0 The underlying premise is, as Jeremy
Bentham once trenchantly observed, that publicity "operates as a check
upon [the] mendacity and incorrectness" of witnesses and "keeps the
judge himself, while trying, under trial."'" Administrative hearings,
however, contain an added element. The dispute is not merely between
private parties; it also involves a public interest in the enforcement of
the agency's mandate. Open hearings are a necessity if this public
interest is to be protected. Public records permit scrutiny of agency
performance and encourage witnesses to be honest and judges fair.
With this background, the problems inherent in administrative
treatment of business secrets should be easier to understand-and,
hopefully, to resolve. The trial examiner faces questions of business
secrets at two levels-during discovery and at the hearing. This is not
to say that difficult procedural trade secret questions do not occur at
other levels of the adjudicatory process-for example, during
investigations" and upon issuance of the complaint-but these questions
tend to be resolved directly by agency decision so I will concentrate on
problems at the discovery and hearing levels. Since different issues are
involved at each stage, I will examine them separately in context.
(I) Discovery
Once the exceptional practice, discovery has now become well
established in most agency procedures. At first administrative adoption
'4 J. MOORE & B. GARFINKEL, FEDERAL PRACTICE 26.22[31, at 1290 (2d ed. 1966).
"See, e.g., 15 U.S.C. § 77 u (1964) (SEC); 49 U.S.C. § 17(3) (1964) (ICC). Section
5(b) of the FTC Act merely states that the Commission shall conduct a "hearing." 15
U.S.C. § 45(b) (1964). Nonetheless, the proceeding is a matter of public record once the
complaint is served. See E. Griffiths Hughes, Inc. v. FTC, 63 F.2d 362, 363 (D.C. Cir.
1933).
"1 J. BENTHAM, RATIONALE OF JUDICIAL EVIDENCE 522, 523 (1827).
1
2See, e.g., FCC v. Schreiber, 381 U.S. 279 (1965).
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of discovery proved illusory as agencies applied restrictive confidentiality
rules to withdraw what liberalized discovery rules appeared to grant. But
as continuous trials replaced interval hearing procedures, basic fairness
has required meaningful discovery. Further impetus will be provided, I
am sure, by proddings from the Administrative Conference which is
currently considering wide-ranging recommendations to increase the
scope of pretrial evidence exchanges.
Agency policy governing the treatment of business secrets has
occasionally been the victim of this maelstrom. Disclosure of business
secrets during discovery has depended, for example, more on who seeks
to learn the business secret and from whom it is being sought, than on
whether disclosure or protection is warranted.
Discovery by government counsel, that is, by the agency, is the natural
starting point. Agency treatment of business secrets at this level is also
the easiest to describe. The hallmark of administrative agencies is their
broad power of investigation and discovery.' 3 Investigative powers are
not limited by the sensitivity of the information sought or by its
location."4 While individual agencies have limited the scope of discovery
available to government counsel to supplement the precomplaint
investigation," the secrecy of the information sought has no bearing on
this question.'6 Any sensitive information acquired by the agency is
automatically entitled to confidential treatment while in government
hands, and it usually is. 7 Congress has generally condemned disclosure
of trade secrets by government employees 8 and re-enacted similar
provisions in many agency enabling acts.'9 Agency rules reinforce these
statutory commands.2 Government counsel's desire to protect his case
and his reliance on the work product privilege further support this
treatment. Consequently, agency discovery of business secrets has
presented few problems for trial'examiners.
The grant of discovery rights to respondents and intervenors in
adjudicatory hearings, on the other hand, has increasingly raised
'13E.g., S. Doc. No. 8, 77th Cong. Ist Sess. 414-15 (1941); Note, Discovery in Federal
Administrative Proceedings, 16 STAN. L. REv. 1035 (1964).
"FCC v. Schreiber, supra note 12. The one exception is the retained copy of a census
report. 13 U.S.C. § 9(a) (1864).
'"A11-State Indus. of N.C., Inc., 3 TRADE REG. REP. 18, 103 at 20,550 (FTC 1967).
"See, e.g., Menzies v. FTC, 242 F.2d 81 (4th Cir. 1957).
'The most famous indiscretion, which in fact only involved disclosure of the name of a
private complainant, was former FTC chariman Howrey's release to presidential assistant
Sherman Adams who passed the information along to friend Bernard Goldfine. H.R. REP.
No. 2711, 85th Cong., 2d Sess. 46-50 (1959). See also R. MILGRIM, supra note 2, § 6.02.
818 U.S.C. § 1905 (1964); 44 U.S.C. § 423(h) (Supp. IV, 1965-68).
"15 U.S.C. §§ 46(f), 50 (1964) (FTC); 21 U.S.C. § 3310j) (supp. IV, 1965-68) (FDA).
"See, e.g., 16 C.F.R. §§ 4.10(a)(2) & (6), 4.10(d) (1969) (FTC); 21 C.F.R. § 130.32
(1969) (FDA).
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questions concerning the protection of business secrets. Here sensitive
information is sought by a private party whose prying eyes will
automatically destroy the business secret; when he sees it, of course, it
is no longer secret. The general statutory edicts, proscriptions in agency
enabling acts, or agency rules prohibiting employee disclosure of trade
secrets do not protect the owner of business secrets; they apply only to
agency personnel and then only against voluntary indiscretions. When
the data is sought from agency files, the various statutes and rules are
inapplicable because the discovering party relies on lawful, that is,
involuntary, process. Moreover, discovery by respondents and
intervenors is accomplished in most cases through subpoena or
deposition of private, third persons possessing this information. Thus,
the burden of deciding whether business secrets are being sought and
whether they deserve protection during discovery falls upon the trial
examiner.
According to agency decisions, the examiner's decision will be affected
by the location of the information, or, to put it another way, by whether
the information is in the agency's files or private party hands.
Examining the simpler situation first, when the private litigant seeks to
discover business secrets from their owners (or private possessors), the
person most intimately concerned with maintaining the secrecy of the
data knows about it immediately and is likely to object. Objection
usually takes the form of a motion to quash the subpoena or to limit
the scope of discovery deposition, or of conditional disclosure on
assurances of confidential treatment. Motions are made to the examiner;
assurances are often arranged informally with private counsel subject to
trial examiner approval." At one time parties sought to guarantee such
conditional disclosure by awaiting judicial enforcement of the subpoena
and by obtaining judicially compelled assurances of nondisclosure
beyond the confines of the case.2 The Supreme Court's decision in FCC
v. Schreiber'3 while technically limited to subpoenas issued during a
public investigation, indicates that this procedure is inappropriate. The
district court is compelled to issue the subpoena upon the agency's
request, if authorized by statute, whether or not confidential information
is sought. Then, when the data is produced the agency has an
opportunity to rule on the witness's request with the sensitive
21While agencies have sought to encourage disclosure to agency personnel by honoring
promises of confidentiality made by agency attorneys, no such policy applies to
representations by private counsel and cautious counsel usually seek additional protection.
nE.g., FCC v. Cohn, 154 F. Supp. 899 (S.D.N.Y. 1957); FTC v. Bowman, 149 F. Supp.
624 (N.D. Ill.), affd, 248 F.2d 456 (7th Cir. 1957).
-3 8 1 U.S. 279 (1965).
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information before it. And only after having exhausted the
administrative process is judicial protection available to prevent
irreparable injury which cannot await review of a final decision in agency
proceedings. 4
Discovery of trade secrets from agency files is a horse of a different
color. The Federal Trade Commission's practices-the current favorite
of those who point with scorn-are illustrative. Until recently, private
parties had only limited rights of discovery from Commission files. FTC
files were covered by a blanket of secrecy on several theories, some valid,
others irrelevant. Priority was given to keeping channels of
communication open with cooperating businessmen or to honoring
confidences established in acquiring the information. The requesting
respondent was an alleged law-breaker, and the Commission asked itself,
why should his position as a defendant in an FTC prosecution allow
respondent free license to rummage through the trade secrets of his
competitors now on file with the agency? Nor did the third party who
owned the secret necessarily know-and therefore have an opportunity
to object-to this potentially damaging disclosure. Rather than looking
at these interests and analyzing their impact on disclosure policies, the
agency ruled that all requests for business secrets (and all other
confidential information) must be made directly to the agency itself. But
once it discovered what was inside the business secret fruit-and finding
itself unable to formulate coherent policies after hearing dozens of
requests-the Commission happily relinquished its fi,'st bite of this
wormy apple and returned the issue where it rightly belonged, to the trial
examiner's lap, subject, of course, to occasional Commission review and
guidance.2 5 As you might suspect, dilatory requests declined and rational
policies were developed with the aid of examiner opinions. Nonetheless,
several restrictions remained, not all of them sound or sensible. Not only
do the usual rules regarding disclosure of trade secrets apply but
respondent must satisfy other conditions which the- FTC puts on private
litigant raids of its files. That is, respondent must demonstrate (a) that
the documents are relevant by describing them with as much precision
as the situation permits and by showing why and how they will aid him
in meeting the charges; (b) that the request is responsible by showing that
the information is critical to his case, will not delay the proceedings, and
cannot be developed in another way; (c) that the documents are not
uSperry & Hutchinson Co. v. FTC, 256 F. Supp. 136 (S.D.N.Y. 1966); R.H. Macy &
Co. v. Tinley, 249 F. Supp. 778 (D.D.C. 1965). Some districts courts have not yet
perceived the message of Schreiber. See. e.g.. FTC v. Continental Can Co., 267 F. Supp.
713 (S.D.N.Y. 1967).
-I6C.F.R. § 3136 (1969).
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available elsewhere, often regardless of the number of sources which
would have to be contacted; and (d) that disclosure is in the interest of
justice."6 These requirements, however, have more to do with agency
reluctance to permit respondent's discovery of agency files than
discovery of business secrets-although these separate questions are
often confused.
One thing seems clear in administrative discovery, however. If the
litigant-be it the respondent, an intervenor, or the
government-establishes a need for disclosure of the business secret in
connection with preparation of its case it is entitled to see or acquire the
secret regardless of the data's location or the impact which disclosure
may have on the trade secret's owner." This principle governs requests
for trade secrets from witnesses during the public hearing as well. It
seems equally clear that the trial examiner's initial examination to
determine whether confidential treatment is warranted should generally
be held in camera if the question of confidentiality is not to be rendered
moot!,
Now that disclosure of business secrets in discovery is aligned to
judicial practice, agencies have also adopted protective measures long
used by courts in preventing unnecessary dissemination of business
secrets disclosed to private litigants. Courts have limited disclosure to
counsel and those assisting him on a need to know basis. For example,
where the data is to be evaluated by disinterested experts, data is revealed
directly to the experts and only the unidentifiable results are revealed to
private parties. Alternatively, the data may be disguised to prevent
recognition of the source of particular information. Two FTC cases,
Grand Union Co. n and Columbia Broadcasting System, Inc.10 illustrate
similar administrative approaches. In these cases respondent's counsel
were permitted to examine, summarize, and copy secret reports which
competitors had filed with the Commission; this information was not to
nSee E. Gellhorn, The Treatment of Confidential Information by the Federal Trade
Commission: Pretrial Practices, 36 U. CHi. L. REV. 113, 159-68 (1968).
21Cf. FCC v. Schreiber, supra note 12; Joint Anti-Fascist Regugee Committee v.
McGrath, 341 U.S. 123, 161-3 (1951); Jencks v. United States, 353 U.S. 657, 670-1
(1957).
2"Koppers Co., 3 TRADE REc. REP. 18,577, at 20,919 (FTC 1968); see Cohn
Zuckman, FCC v. Schreiber: In Camera and the Administrative Agency, 56 GEo. L.J. 451
(1968). In Koppers the FTC also suggested that the examiner might excise unneeded secrets
from documents before disclosing them to respondent.
B62 F.T.C. 1491 (1963).
-62 F.T.C. 1518 (1963). Because of judicial concern with the harmful effects of
disclosure, the FTC has occasionally given explicit orders to government counsel and his
experts to hold sensitive data in confidence. Koppers Co., supra note 28; see Graber Mfg.
Co. v. Dixon, 223 F. Supp. 1020 (D.D.C. 1963).
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be disclosed to anyone other than such counsel except experts specifically
approved by the trial examiner. Disclosure to respondent-that is, the
private business as distinct from its attorney-was expressly forbidden.
Other cases have gone further and limited disclosure to the independent
experts alone.3 Confidentiality pending the hearing has also been
maintained by keeping depositions off the public record.32
The FTC has made clear, however, that protective measures are not
automatically applicable every time business secrets are sought by
private litigants during discovery. Rather, as in Furr's, Inc.,3 the
Commission has pointedly noted that the effect of any restrictions on
respondent's "practical and expeditious preparation of its defense" is to
be balanced against the sensitivity of the data, the likelihood of its
ultimate disclosure on the public record at trial, and the need to prevent
undue delay or confusion in the conduct of the proceeding. While these
words have a platitudinous ring which sounds good to the ears, unless
applied with discrimination they will lead to unfortunate results.
Confidential treatment limited to the pretrial stage can usually be
granted freely by the trial examiner without impairing public or private
interests. The standard should not be the same as that applied in
determining whether protective measures are warranted during the
hearing. There is no "public interest" in disseminating discovery on the
public record as there is in the full disclosure of trial evidence. Nor
should discovery be sidetracked into lengthy hearings on whether
protective treatment is warrafited. In discovery, counsel's professional
statement should generally be sufficient. The information may never be
introduced into evidence so the trial question may be irrelevant; and the
objecting party's concern may relate to disclosure to the public at large
rather than to release to respondent.
(2) The Hearing
Moving on to the trial, then, the question of business secrets arises in
administrative hearings in two ways: upon the introduction of
documentary evidence or in the elicitation of testimony. As I noted
earlier, administrative agency hearings 6n adjudicatory matters, with few
exceptions, are public. Coupled with this requirement is the general duty
incumbent upon all witnesses to give their testimony freely. Privileges
from this duty are as excepti'onal in agency hearings as in courts.
In agency trials, these principles have two ramifications. First, the
"Mississippi River Fuel Corp., Dkt. 8657 (FTC June 8, 1966, July 15, 1966).
"
2Koppers Co., Dkt. 8755 (FTC July 9, 1968).
nDkt. No. 8581 (FTC November 18, 1963). See also Koppers, Co., supra note 28.
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trade secret "privilege" is circumscribed by limiting the definition of
what constitutes a business secret. As a corollary, protective measures
such as in camera hearings and sealed transcripts are exceptional rather
than commonplace. The problems are similar to those facing the trial
examiner during discovery; but their resolution may vary. Again, this
analysis follows Federal Trade Commission practice, primarily because
its procedures have given rise to most of the published opinions on these
questions. A persual of other agency rulings indicates that FTC practices
are unexceptionalm except, perhaps, that they are more fully developed
than in most agencies.
At one time agencies such as the FTC freely granted claims for trade
secret -protection even though disclosure by testimony or through
documents was compelled. It did so by acceeding to most requests for
secret hearings and sealed records." Judicial standards for -recognizing
the trade secret privilege were adopted with modification.3 Some courts,
moreover, seemed to suggest that it was the agency's burden to prove
th" propriety of holding public hearings when the privilege was asseted. 37
All this was turned around in the leading case of H.P. Hood & Sons,
Inc., when the FTC sharply restricted those situations in which the trial
examiner should permit the receipt of evidence in camera. In Hood and
later cases 9 it was established that: (1) the burden of showing good cause
for secret treatment rests on the party seeking an in camera order; and
(2) this burden is satisfied only by demonstrating that public disclosure
would result in "clearly defined, serious injury to the person or
corporation whose records are involved." This vague standard, however,
proved unsatisfactory to parties and trial examiners alike. Agency
decisions invariably reiterated the "open records" policy while they, in
fact, recognized innumberable exceptions. A perusual of published
opinions or comparison of supporting facts revealed no clear pattern.4 0
Take, for example, the treatment of sales and price data which
businessmen claimed were entitled to secret handling. Current sales and
price data are generally entitled to secrecy; dated information is not. But
decisions as to what constitutes "current" information are
irreconcilable. Two FTC decisions are illustrative. In Crown Cork &
Seal Co.+;" the Commission denied in camera protection to sales data
USee Cohn & Zuckman, supra note 28.
"See, e.g., Uarco, Inc., 58 F.T.C. 1168 (1968); Pure Oil Co., 57 F.T.C. 1542 (1960).
4E.g., Maico Co., 51 F.T.C. 1197, 1202 (1955).
31See FTC v. Bowman, supra note 22.
u58 F.T.C. 1184, 1188 (1961).
"See Gellhorn. supra note 4, at 408-22.
Old. at 419-22.
"Dkt. No. 8687 (FTC June 26, 1967).
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ranging in age from two and one-half to six and one-half years even
though submitted by a nonparty witness whose request for
confidentiality was not opposed by either government or respondent's
counsel. By comparison, in National Tea Co.," the FTC did not disturb
a trial examiner's order that seven-year-old price and sales figures be
treated as business secrets. Unlike most FTC stories, this one has a
happier ending. In response to criticism, the Commission has recently
given content to the "serious injury" standard-of what business secrets
are entitled to protection-by adopting a proposed test which requires
that the trial examiner weigh five factors in determining whether the item
is a "business secret" entitled to protection. In Lehigh Portland Cement
Co.,"3 the Commission suggests that the trial examiner ask and answer
the following questions:
I. How many people have knowledge of the supposedly
"secret" information? Will disclosure increase that number to a
significant degree?
2. Does the contested information have any value to the
possessor? To a competitor? Is that value substantial?
3. Did the party possessing the information incur any expense
in its development? Has he had a sufficient opportunity to realize
an adequate return on that investment?
4. What damage, if any, would the possessor of the secret
suffer from its disclosure? What advantages would his competitors
reap from disclosure?
5. What benefits are likely to flow from disclosure? To whom?
Are they significant? In this connection, what is the public
"need"for disclosure? Can it be satisfied in any other way?
Once the examiner determines that the secret really is a business secret
entitled to protection, he must still decide what protection to order. He
has several choices. In most situations, if decided cases are our guide,
the examiner should order a secret hearing, seal the record, limit the
parties' use of such evidence in briefs (or require separate in camera
briefs for secret data), and impose a duty of continuing secrecy on the
part of those participating in the in camera hearing." But the trial
4'11965-1967 Transfer Binder] TRADE REG. REP. 17,463, at 22,699 (FTC 1966). But
see Columbia Broadcasting System, Inc., 3 TRADE REG. REP. 18,037, at 20,459 (FTC
1967).
133 TRADE REG. REP. 18,475, at 20,832-33 (FTC 1968), quoting from Gellhorn, supra
note 4, at 422-23.
"The FRC's rules also provide that protective orders must include a date on which in
camera treatment will expire. 16 C.F.R. § 3.45(b) (1969).
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examiner need not choose between a silent and probably meaningless
public'record and filll but harmful disclosure. The FTC has suggested
to its examiners that the party seeking in camera treatment can be
required, if feasible, to prepare a non-confidential summary of the
document or testimony for inclusion in the public record." Where
practicable, this alternative is the path for the future since it protects
both the public interest in a meaningful record and the private interest
in maintAining the confidentiality of business secrets.
I Koppers Co., supra note 28.

